Data Feed Diagnostician
Evaluates the health of each data feed link.
Requires valid evidence.
Agentic SRE / Airspace monitoring
Sentinel
High-assurance agentic reliability for streaming data pipelines.
AI agents diagnose data feed health from evidence. A deny-by-default gate bounds what they can touch. A named, authenticated person makes every decision.
Access is by invitation. Principal: Marlon Ridley
Strategic posture
High-assurance agentic reliability for streaming data pipelines
This capability delivers governed decision intelligence. It gives duty managers and system integrators complete visibility and automated diagnostic reasoning over streaming data pipelines, backed by SHA-256-sealed, append-only audit records and strict policy enforcement, while guaranteeing that operational control remains entirely in human hands.
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The problem
Large distributed systems, such as those behind airspace monitoring, rely on real-time data pipelines carrying multiple file formats, and their health has to be known with high fidelity.
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The boundary
Human triage is slow and reactive. Autonomous AI violates strict ATO and zero-trust mandates, because it is not deterministic.
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The objective
Sentinel isolates AI reasoning from operational execution. Multi-agent orchestration gives rapid, evidence-based recommendations; an authenticated person approves every one.
- 1Deterministic ingest
- 2Evidence-grounded diagnosis
- 3Policy-as-code gate
- 4Human authorization
Layers 1 & 2
Adversarial multi-agent synthesis
The Data Feed Diagnostician and Correlation Analyst give two independent views of an incident. The Red-Team Critic is what keeps a hallucination from becoming an incident response.
Correlation Analyst
Maps anomalies across data feeds and services.
Prohibits unproven causation.
Red-Team Critic
Reviews every assumption adversarially.
Hunts ungrounded claims.
Watch Officer
Synthesizes the operational brief.
Zero execution authority.
Deterministic fallback guarantee. Every specialist agent has rule-based fallback logic, so an investigation always completes, even when a model is unavailable, over budget or wrong.
Layer 3
Zero-trust policy gate
"Deny by default" at the tool level means an agent cannot invoke a capability it was not granted, even if it is prompt-injected through a corrupted pipeline payload string.
Agent request
AGT policy gate
LiteLLM router
01. Identity
SPIFFE/SPIRE workload identity and mutual TLS. Application services get their database credentials from Vault, never from a file.
02. Governance
Deny-by-default policies for every model call and tool call, evaluated by the Agent Governance Toolkit, failing closed.
03. Protection
Automated redaction before anything reaches a model.
Layer 4
The governance: agentic reasoning logged
Reasoning, recorded
Low risk domain
- Every investigation is sealed (SHA-256) and stored append-only.
- Every model call is logged: agent, model, tokens, cost, policy verdict.
- Every claim cites evidence; ungrounded claims are rejected.
Agentic Reasoning Logged
Decisions, signed
High risk domain
- Agents are denied decide and write tools by policy.
- Every staged action waits for a named, role-checked person.
- Approvals, overrides and rejections are signed by a human.
Strict Human Approval
Deployment
Audit-proof verification
End-to-end proof
Synthetic cascade-failure scenarios run through the whole pipeline in the test suite.
Traceability
Every recorded claim links to the evidence behind it.
Data protection
Append-only database triggers on the audit log, investigations and model calls.
Network isolation
Every port on the host is bound to loopback; the public site arrives through an outbound-only tunnel.